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Invalid Patents: Removing Statutory Protection
From Improperly Granted Monopolies
When a patent is granted by the United States Patent Office the
patentee essentially acquires a 17-year monopoly.' The antimonopo-
listic policy of the American conscience has, however, worked to
restrict the grant.2 While the patent holder has a legal right to ex-
dude anyone from manufacturing or selling his invention 3 and may
even enjoin an innocent buyer from using the product,4 various de-
vices employed by him to exploit his legal monopoly have been pro-
scribed upon a finding that such practices constitute an abuse of the
patent grant and operate to unduly restrain free competition.' But
1 15 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). The monopoly consists of not only the right to make,
use, or sell the patented product, but also the power to exclude others from doing so.
After 17 years, the information revealed in the patent may be used by anyone.
2Even the constitutional mandate which grants monopolies "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, has been challenged. Moreover, the assumption that patents pro-
mote progress has not been universally accepted:
On the contrary, we know from long and bitter experience that, if alienated
to private monopolists under exclusive patent grants, new knowledge will
be supressed, restricted, or retarded, or used for antisocial purposes, such as
concentration of economic power, destruction of competition, and exploitation
of consumers. Statement of Dr. Horace M. Gray before the Subcomm. of
the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24
(1963), quoted in Chope, Conflicts Betwee Patents and the Antitrust Laws,
49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 819, 821 (1967).
See also REPORT ON THE RELATION OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO THE STIMULATION
OF NEW INDuSTREs, quoted in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 640
(2d Cir. i942).
3 
"Wiioever without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention ... in-
fringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1964).
4 See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. -Co. v. Carpenter Printing Co., 234 FR Supp.
418 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
5 See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (prohibiting the extending of
royalties past the life of the patent); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (prohibiting the tying of an unpatented article to a patented
machine); American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.
1959) (prohibiting compulsory package licensing); National Lockwasher Co. v. George
K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1945) (prohibiting arrangements which prevent
licensees from dealing in competitive products). One author has observed: "No alert
lawyer or informed judge can fail to recognize that ... there has been an accelerating
abrasion, an enormous erosion, and a constant curtailment of what was formerly thought
to be lawful conduct in the exploitation of a patent. In the judicial cold war between
patent exploitation and basic antitrust policy, antitrust has usually prevailed." Austern,
Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEo. WASH. L
REV. 1015 (1965).
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the antimonopolistic sentiment that has forced a reexamination of
the limits of the legal patent monopoly has had little effect on the
more critical problem of determining whether the patent itself is
valid and thus entitled to a competitive advantage.'
Because of the potential for having to defend a suit for patent
infringement the mere issuance of even an invalid patent is often
sufficient to permit the holder to exclude competitors.7 Moreover,
where the threat of impending litigation does not discourage com-
petitors, a competitor may find himself without a market for the
product if his customers fail to share in his belief of the patent's
invalidity.8 Thus, the advantages which flow to the holder of an
invalid patent operate to a very large extent to injure competitors
and to restrain trade. Although the activities of invalid patent
holders are potentially more anticompetitive than the abusive prac-
tices of legitimate patent holders, unlike the latter, the holders of
invalid patents traditionally have managed to escape the proscrip-
tive reach of the law.
For competitors seeking to alleviate the anticompetitive effects
caused by the improper issuance of a patent a number of alternatives
may be available. It is the purpose of this Note to examine those
alternatives. The analysis will proceed both from the standpoint
of preventing the improper issuance of patents by the Patent Office
and by evaluating the litigious avenues available for launching a
6 Although judicial enforcement of any statutory right is contingent upon a finding
that the patent was validly issued, the competitive advantages of a patent grant are not
confined to legal proscription.
7 See Ladd, Business Aggression Under the Patent System, 26 U. CI. L REv. 353,
362-63 (1959), wherein the author states:
Even the weakest of patents, "vulgarly dubbed 'zombies' or 'scarecrows'"
offers a threat to potential defendants. Patent suits are notoriously expensive.
The services of patent counsel are costly, as are the services of experts whose
talents are usually required in patent litigation. Laboratory facilities normally
devoted to research must be occupied for tests and other activities related to
the lawsuit. Particularly disruptive is the fact that valuable personnel, execu-
tive and technical, suffer interruption of their customary productive work in
order to allocate time and work to the lawsuit. There are, in addition, the
costs of going to trial since the money saving expedient of summary judg-
ment is rarely available.
8 Although the competing manufacturer might try to alleviate this problem by con-
tracting to indemnify any user of his product who is sued for infringement, it is ap-
parent that as a practical matter indemnification agreements do not eliminate customer
hesitancy to buy a device that a least prima fade infringes another's patent. One au-
thor has explained that indemnification agreements are ineffective to assure customer
acceptance because (1) "the manufacturer's financial position might be such that his
customers would not feel confidence in the indemnification agreement," (2) "business-
men simply do not wish to become involved in a lawsuit;" and (3) "reimbursement
may not compensate.., for adverse publicity attending the lawsuit." Ladd, supra note
7, at 364 n.50.
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private or governmental attack against the holder of an invalid
patent.
I. PREVENTING THE ISSUANCE OF INVALID PATENTS
A. The Birth of an Invalid Patent
An inventor who believes that his invention deserves patent pro-
tection may obtain a patent by convincing only one patent exam-
iner9 that his invention has complied with seven complex statutory
requirements.'0 With one exception, the proceeding is private and
no one but the examiner may show reasons why the patent should
not issue." Determination of whether the applicant is actually the
inventor and whether the invention is useful rest on the assump-
tion that the applicant is telling the truth.12  Determining that the
invention is "new" often requires knowledge of the world's tech-
nological developments that is beyond the capability of the human
mind" and the decision that it is not "obvious" can be "highly sub-
jective."'" Against this background, it is not surprising that a large
9 Of course, if the examiner rejects his application, the inventor will have to con-
vince higher authorities that his invention deserves patent protection. This appellate
procedure begins with the Patent Office Board of Appeals from which an appeal may
be taken to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals or, alternatively, to the District
Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The application uld-
mately may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. These appellate procedures are out-
lined in the following statutes: 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (1964); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254,
1256, 1291 (1964).
-10The seven primary requirements are: (1) That the invention is a personal dis-
covery not abandoned by another, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (c), (f) (1964); (2) it is a "new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... or improvement
thereof," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964); (3) the nature of the patent's subject matter is non-
obvious, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964); (4) the claimed invention or improvement is novel,
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1964); (5) there is a lack of prior knowledge or use, 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1964); (6) the disclosure was "full, clear, concise, and exact," 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1964); and (7) the invention is distinctly claimed, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964). See Sted-
man, The U.S. Patent System and its Current Problems, 42 TEXAs L REV. 450, 456-63
(1964).
"lThe one exception is the interference procedure conducted by the Patent Office
when two applicants or an applicant and a patentee claim the same invention. For an
expanded discussion of the interference procedure, see text accompanying notes 22-25
infra. But cf. note 34 infra.
12 See, e.g., rules 65 & 132 of the Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§
1.65, .132 (1967). See also Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a
Unitary Theory, 35 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 512, 529 (1967); Joel, Fraud in the Procure-
ment of a Patent, 49 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 596, 597-98 (1967).
13 Among other sources, one -would have to have a knowledge of over 3,473,164
issued United States patents, millions of foreign patents, and thousands of technical
publications. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
14 One author has noted that the determination of the patentability of an invention
"may be greatly influenced by the judge's personal reaction to the invention, his atti-
tudes toward the desirability and effect of the patent monopoly, and his feeling as to-
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number of the patents issued are, in fact, improperly granted stat-
utory monopolies.'"
One of the major causes for the issuance of invalid patents is
fraud practiced by the patentee in processing his patent application.'6
An applicant may knowingly misrepresent that his invention was
not previously known or used,'17 or that he was the first inventor.'
Patents have even been issued on the basis of falsified documents
submitted to meet the requirement of usefulness. 9 In the majority
of the cases, the fraudulent misrepresentations are material, i.e., if
the truth had been told, the patent would not have issued. But
even if the fraud is not material, the patent may still be invalid.20
For example, a patent applicant, knowing of no use for his inven-
tion, might falsify documents to convince the examiner that the
invention has met the statutory requirement of having some utility.
The examiner, however, may know of a different, valid use for the
applicant's invention and regard the applicant's willful misrepre-
sentations as supplemental. Nevertheless, such reprehensible con-
duct may itself be enough to strip the invention of statutory pro-
tection.2'
whether the reward is commensurate with the contribution." Stedman, supra note 10,
at 459.
15 Actually, it seems that the chances are greater that the patent is invalid than valid.
One study showed that during the years 1940 to 1960 an average of only 29 percent of
the contested patents were held valid by courts of appeals. See Wood, An Appraisal
of Recent Cases Respecting Patents and Anti-trust Laws, 21 Bus. LAw. 999 (1966).
16 This Note distinguishes two types of invalid patents: (1) those invalid because
of fraud, and (2) those invalid because of mistake. Where this distinction is impor-
tant, the patents will be referred to as "fraudulent" invalid patents and "nonfraudulent"
invalid patents, respectively. Otherwise, the term invalid patents should be understood
to include all invalid patents regardless of the source of invalidity.
17 See United States v. Frazer, 22 F. 106 (N.D. Ill. 1884).
18United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) [hereinafter cited
as American Bell 11.
19 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
2 0 See, e.g., Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 271 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966),
rev'd oan other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1967). But see Waterman Bic Pen
Corp. v. W.A. Shaeffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849 (D. Del. 1967).
Where the fraud on the Patent Office is not material, the courts have termed the
patent "unenforceable" rather than "invalid." This distinction is a result of the
courts' application of the equitable rule of unclean hands which precludes enforcement
even though the patent satisfies all the statutory requirements. But these distinctions do
not affect the potential harm inherent in a patent not entitled to judicial recognition.
For the purposes of this Note, therefore, reference to fraudulent invalid patents is
without regard to whether the fraud involved was material or not.
21 Removing patent protection in such a case is justified by the need to preserve
the integrity of the administrative system. Thus, while the deception relates to matters
extrinsic to the validity of the actual invention, and although all the statutory require-
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Another Patent Office practice susceptible to manipulation by
unscrupulous individuals is the interference proceeding.22 Under
the current Patent Act the person who first invents a particular
device is entitled to a patent. If two parties claim to have invented
the same device, the Commissioner of Patents will initiate an inter-
ference proceeding to determine who is the first inventor. Although
the parties cannot directly attack the merits of their respective appli-
cations,23 the proceeding may indirectly reveal to the Patent Office
facts which would bar the issuance of any patent. Thus, when the
parties to an interference proceeding realize that they may all be
eventual losers, "it may appear commercially prudent to unite, effect
a license or interchange arrangement for any patent that issues,
move to have the interference dissolved, and obtain an invalid
patent to be commercially exploited under the presumption of va-
lidity."2 4  Because it involves an omission or supression of possibly
relevant information, the "fraud" under these circumstances may
be more elusive than the willful misrepresentations that are present
in falsified applications. 25  Nevertheless, the result is the same
issuance of an invalid patent.
Not all invalid patents, however, are the result of fraud. The
applicant may honestly believe that his invention was not "known
or used by others in this country" or "described in a printed publi-
cation."26 And the examiner, despite a good faith attempt to assure
that the invention is novel, may still be ignorant of existing facts
which would preclude the issuance of a patent.2 7 Regardless of
ments have been satisfied, the chicanery in the prosecution of the patent will be con-
sidered fatal. See Antitrust Panel Discussion (Comments by Professor Handle), AM.
PAT, L. Ass'N BULL. 279 (April-May 1969). See also Stedman, Acquisition of Patents
and Know-how by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and Grant-Back, 12 ANTiTRST BULL. 199,
215-21 (1967).
22 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
2 3 See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 317 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1963).
2 4 Kennedy, supra note 12, at 533.
25 In fact, the highly suspect nature of private interference settlements led Congress
to enact the requirement that a copy of the agreement be filed with the Patent Office.
See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (c) (1964); H.R. REBP. No. 1983, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19
(1962); Davis, Patent Licensing and the Anti-trust Laws: Some Recent Developments,
46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 12, 32-38 (1964). But this requirement is by no means a
panacea for all collusive practices.
26 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1964).
2 7 See, e.g., Delco Chems., Inc. v. Cee-Bee Chem. Co., 157 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. Cal.
1957). In addition, the examiner may have looked at prior inventions or disclosures
but, through lack of a comprehensive understanding of the subject, failed to realize
that former inventions had anticipated the invention under consideration and bar its
patentability.
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the good intentions of both parties, the fact remains that under
such circumstances a patent may issue which offends both the letter
and the spirit of the patent law.2 8  From the standpoint of one
who is attempting to compete in a field unlawfully restricted by
an invalid patent, the potential harm he may suffer is the same re-
gardless of whether the invalidity is the product of innocent omis-
sions, collusion, or willful misrepresentation.
B. Pre-issuance Remedies
Under present application procedures there is little the Patent
Office can do to reduce the number of invalid patents produced by
the abuses and mistakes discussed above. First, the Patent Office
has no general statutory authority to investigate or initiate proceed-
ings to cancel patents which it may subsequently learn were im-
properly issued.29 Only in the case of an interference proceeding
between an applicant and a patentee which is terminated in favor
of the applicant can the Office cancel claims in the patentee's
patent.3 ° Second, although the Commissioner of Patents may initi-
ate an action for perjury,"' this remedy has seldom been employed,
and would be of no value in deterring the issuance of nonfraudu-
lent invalid patents. Third, under the present Patent Office pro-
cedure there is little hope that any internal reorganization will
significantly reduce the issuance of invalid patents.'
2 8 By one theory, the government grants to the patent holder the limited power of
excluding others from using a particular invention in exchange for disclosing his
patentable advancement in the art. If in fact the "invention" is not patentable the
'1contract" is without consideration, and the 17-year monopoly cannot be justified.
See generally Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
649 (1947).
2 9 See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
80 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1964).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964); 35 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Since the statute is penal in nature, the courts require that the evidence prove "beyond
a reasonable doubt" that defendant willfully and knowingly misrepresented. See
Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1951).
32 For a discussion of the Patent Office's internal administrative problems, see
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKs AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE Comm.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1961-62 MANAGEMENT SURVEY OF THE
U.S. PATENT OFFICE (Comm. Print 1962); Stedman, supra note 10, at 474-79.
INVALID PATENTS
The private litigant is also without effective means to prevent
the issuance of invalid patents. Patent applications are kept secret,3 3
and even in the unlikely situation where one learns of a pending
application that he believes does not merit patent protection no
positive remedy is available. a4 As a practical matter, therefore,
challenging the patentability of a particular device can only be done
after the Patent Office has granted a 17-year monopoly.
II. METHODS OF ATTACKING IMPROPERLY
GRANTED PATENTS
The issuance of a patent is not a guarantee that the patent is
valid. Although there is a presumption of validity,35 the Patent Act
authorizes the courts to independently reevaluate inventions to de-
termine whether the statutory requirements have been met36 and
whether the patentee is entitled to the grant. The courts may de-
clare a patent invalid after finding that the invention is not novel
or useful,37 and often this decision is based on information over-
looked by the Patent Office because of mistake or fraud. Thus,
there are no limitations on a court's power to examine the substance
of an invention and, upon concluding that the device is not worthy
of patent protection, to grant suitable relief. The real question,
however, is procedural in the sense that the courts must determine
who has standing to adjudicate a patent's validity and under what
circumstances a challenge will be recognized. In this regard, the
two parties likely to seek standing to challenge a patent's validity
are the federal government and the private litigant.
33 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1964).
34 Under the literal language of rule 292 of the United States Patent Office Rules of
Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1969), it appears that if one discovers a pending applica-
tion which he believes would be barred because of prior public use or sale he may
seek an inter partes hearing to determine his claim. In addition, under rule 291, 37
C.F.R. § 1.291 (1969), one knowing of prior patents or publications which he feels
anticipate the invention may submit such information to the Patent Office for ex
parte consideration. Despite the language of these rules, however, the author has been
unable to find any record of their use in challenging patent applications. This may be
explained by the difficulty in discovering the pendency of a patent application and the
additional discouraging language of rule 291 that "the patent statutes do not provide
for opposition to the grant of a patent .... Protests ... are ordinarily merely acknowl-
edged." 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (1969).
35 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964) provides: "A patent shall be presumed valid. The bur-
den of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on the party asserting it."
30 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1964). See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
37 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(2)-(4) (1964).
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 247
A. The Government's Weapons
Since the government may on its own initiative - or conceivably
at the request of a private party 8 - bring actions against holders
of invalid patents, it is important to examine the procedures and
remedies available to the government as well as those available to
private parties.
1. Government Suits to Cancel a Patent Procured by Fraud.-
Neither the present patent legislation 9 nor any of its predeces-
sors40 granted the Federal Government the right to sue to cancel in-
valid patents.4 ' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in United States
v. American Bell Telephone Co. (American Bell I),42 recognized
the government's common law right to seek cancellation of fraudu-
lently obtained patents. Realizing the potential public harm that
a fraudulently procured patent could cause, the Court reasoned that
an equivalent to the English writ of scire facias3 was needed to
give relief against fraudulently procured monopolies and upheld the
government's suit in equity to vacate the patent. Although subse-
quent cases have confirmed the government's right to protect the
public from fraudulently procured patents,44 few such suits have
been brought.45 The inherent difficulties in eliminating an invalid
3 8 For example, most of the actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), discussed later in this article, are initiated by the filing of a complaint by a
private individual. See text accompanying notes 89-109 infra.
39 The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
40 The previous major patent acts were the Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat.
198; the Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246; the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5
Star. 117; the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; the Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1
Stat. 109.
4 1 The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 15, 1 Star. 109, and the Patent Act of 1793, ch.
11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, however, provided for private suits to cancel fraudulently ob-
tained patents until repealed by the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
42 128 U.S. 315 (1888). The United States charged, inter alia, that Alexander
Graham Bell had fraudulently obtained his patent by intentionally concealing that the
claimed improvements were known and used by others. Both Bell and his assignee,
the Bell Telephone Company, demurred to the charges, contending that the govern-
meat lacked the legal authority to challenge patents it had issued. For a good analysis
of the factors contributing to the decision in American Bell I, see Note, Patents - The
Assertion of a Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Means of Defeating the Patent
Monopoly, 13 N.Y.L.F. 325, 331-36 (1967).
43 Historically, a writ was issued to repeal charters and grants: "When the king
has granted a thing by false suggestion, he may by scire facias repeal his own grant."
Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 439 (1871), quoted in American Bell I,
128 U.S. at 368-69.
4 4 See, e.g., United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1947).
45 Since American Bell I was decided the government has prosecuted only four
cases to cancel fraudulently obtained patents. See American Bell II, 167 U.S. 224
(1897); United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957),
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patent through a suit for cancellation may well explain the govern-
ment's inactivity. For example, the government must prove that
the applicant, knowing of the falsity, misrepresented a material fact
with intent to deceive, and that the Patent Office, ignorant of the
falsity, was induced to act upon the misrepresentation. 6 Mere
omissions47 or misleading statements48 are not enough and proof
of scienter is required. Furthermore, the courts have required a
high level of proof to substantiate these necessary elements.49
Since American Bell I the government has failed to prevail in a
suit to cancel a fraudulently procured patent.50 Thus, lack of suc-
cess, coupled with the fact that fraudulently procured patents prob-
ably constitute only a small portion of the total number of invalid
patents, make this judicially created remedy an impractical method
for removing the unlawful monopolies of invalid patents.51
2. Government Suits Attacking Nonfraudulent Invalid Patents.-
As noted above, not all invalid patents are invalid because they
were fraudulently obtained. 2 They may have been obtained in
good faith; nevertheless, facts not known to either the Patent Of-
fice or the patentee may subsequently operate to invalidate the
grant. Since a nonfraudulently obtained patent may produce the
same deleterious effects on the public interest as the fraudulently
obtained patent, it follows that the government should have a simi-
lar remedy to cancel the invalid patent.
In United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. (American
appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
73 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1947); United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp.
127 (N.D. Ohio 1945), affd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cit. 1947).
4GUnited States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1945),
affd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947). For a good analysis of the meaning of fraud in
patent suits, see Cullen & Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 110, 124-34 (1960).
47 United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957),
appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958).
48United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1945),
affd, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cit. 1947).
49American Bell 11, 167 U.S. at 251. See also United States v. Cold Metal Proc-
ess Co., 62 F. Supp. 127, 140 (N.D. Ohio 1945), af!d, 164 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947),
wherein the court stated: "[raud... is not proven by a mere preponderance of the
evidence but must be established by clear, unequivocal and convincing proof."
50 American Bell 11, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co.,
155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958);
United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1954), af'd, 164
F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1947).
51 See Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power,
77 HARV. L REV. 1505, 1509-10 (1964).
52 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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Bell II),53 the government brought suit to cancel an allegedly in-
valid patent because the invention had been in public use for more
than 2 years before the application was filed. The Supreme Court,
distinguishing this case from its predecessor American Bell I, held
that unless the patent was procured by fraud, the government had
no standing to sue for cancellation. The Court supported its holding
on two grounds: First, that the judiciary had no authority to col-
laterally attack the judgment of the Patent Office, and second, that
since any individual sued under the patent could raise the defense
of prior public use, the government should not be "permitted to
maintain a suit in equity to cancel that against which the individ-
ual has a perfect legal defense ..... , But when the patent was
procured by fraud, the Court noted, the government was under a
duty to seek cancellation to protect the "public interest."56  It is
anomalous, however, that the overriding "public interest" that
gives the government standing to attack the fraudulently obtained
invalid patent should not also permit the challenge of nonfraudu-
lently obtained invalid patents. Although reason,57 policy,58 and
experience " dictate that the distinction should be abolished, a recent
decision 0 by the District Court for the District of Columbia indi-
cates that the 71-year old American Bell 11 doctrine is still very
much alive. Barring a substantial change in the doctrine, the gov-
ernment's efforts in this area will continue to be ineffective.
53 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
54 128 U.S. 315 (1888). See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
55 167 U.S. at 266.
56 Id.
57 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
5 8 Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. McClaren summarized the policy considera-
tions as follows:
We also believe that attacks on invalid patents will have a beneficial effect
on the quality of patents generally. Evidence of the Government's very
willingness to sue will tend to promote a high standard of integrity among
those prosecuting patent applications and thereby provide additional protec-
tion to the public against the burden of invalid patents. Address by Assistant
Attorney General Richard McClaren, 13th Annual Conference of the Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Research Institute of George Washington Uni-
versity, June 5, 1969, in 161 U.S.P.Q. No. 11, at V (June 1969) [hereinafter
cited as McClaren].
59 See Note, Revocation of a Patent by Government Suit, 48 YALE LJ. 1095,
1098 (1939), wherein the author examines the historical foundations of the patent
system and concludes that "the inference that the United States may, in suitable situa-
tions, resort to its courts to revoke letters-patent appears inescapable."
,0 United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. & Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 72,828, at 87,031 (D.D.C. June 4, 1969). For a discussion
of this case, see note 82 & text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
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3. Government Suits Attacking Invalid Patents Under the
Sherman Act.- Well before the enactment of the antitrust laws the
courts had dearly established the government's right to sue for can-
cellation of fraudulently procured patents."1 In the case of most
fraudulently procured patents, therefore, the Sherman Act 2 at most
supplemented an existing right. But the passage of the Sherman
Act did shed new light on the doctrine of the American Bell cases
that the government was estopped to collaterally attack a patent'
whose invalidity was not a product of fraud on the Patent Office.
The Act reemphasized the dominant public interest to free the
economy from unlawful restraints of trade 3 and focused new at-
tention on the limitations and immunities of the patent monopoly.
The government's initial challenge of the patent monopoly un-
der the new antitrust laws centered around the practices used to
exploit the patent grant. 4 Many once-sanctioned practices, such
as mandatory package licensing,05 tying arrangements, 6 and certain
pooling agreements, 67 were successfully attacked as "contracts in re-
straint of trade" and "attempts to monopolize." Although these
suits did not consider the validity of the patent itself or the possible
antitrust implications of an invalid patent, they did at least recog-
nize the paramount antitrust policy to examine all possible monop-
olies and restraints of trade despite any apparent statutory immu-
nity.68
The government's first attacks on a patent's validity under the
61 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
62 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sherman Act].
Section 1 prohibits "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... "" 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964). Section 2 condemns "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations ... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). The remaining sections deal generally
with problems of procedure, jurisdiction, and definition of terms in sections 1 and 2.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3-7 (1964).
6 3 See generally REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL's NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY
THE ANn-T Js LAws 1-12 (1955).
64 For a discussion of patent practices prohibited by the antitrust laws, see Kadish,
Patents and Antitrust: Guides and Caveats, 13 PAT., T.M., & Copy'RiGs-T J. oF RES.
& EDuC. 83 (Spring 1969).
65 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
G6 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
67 United States v. New Wrinkle, 324 U.S. 371 (1952).
6 8 See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), involving a
successful attack on certain price maintenance provisions in which the Supreme Court
noted "possession of a... patent ... does not give the patentee any exemption from
the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the units of the patent monopoly." Id. at
308.
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antitrust laws were combined with attacks on the alleged illegal
methods in which the patent was being used. As early as 1926
the government challenged a patent's validity as part of an illegal
combination, 69 and a few years later the government attacked the
merits of a patent in conjunction with the licensor's unlawful re-
strictions on the patent's use.70 Until the district court decision in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,71 however, procedural
problems prevented judicial resolution of the question of whether
a patent's involvement with other violations sufficiently justified
the government's attack on its validity.
In Gypsum, the government charged both that the defendant's
patent licensing agreements violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act and, in the alternative, that the licensing agreements
violated the Act because the patents themselves were invalid. The
district court held that the antitrust context had not changed the
common law doctrine that the government was estopped to "take
with one hand what it has granted with another" and denied the
government's request to show that the inventions did not merit
patent protection. Since the district court later found that the
patent licensing agreements did not violate the Act,73 the complaint
was dismissed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the licensing agree-
ments constituted an unlawful exploitation of the patent monopoly
in violation of the Sherman Act and reversed the district court. 4
More importantly, however, the Court noted that "this issue need
not be decided to dispose of this case .. . . In a suit to vindicate
the public interest by enjoining violations of the Sherman Act,
the United States should have the same opportunity to show
69 United States v. Porcelain Appliance Corp., Civ. No. 1640 E (N.D. Ohio Sept.
9, 1926). The court denied a motion to strike the government's allegations pertaining
to the validity of the patents. This case is summarized in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889, 893 (D.D.C. 1943).
70 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 53 F.2d 617 (N.D. Ill. 1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). The district court was divided on the question of
whether the government could show patent invalidity, and the Supreme Court did not
pass on the question. See also Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell
& Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972 (D. Mass. 1943).
71 53 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1943) (dealing solely with the question of whether the
government could challenge the integrity of the patent). In later proceedings, United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397 (D.D.C. 1946), rev'd, 333 U.S.
364 (1948), the issue of whether the licensing agreement actually violated the Sherman
Act was decided.
72 53 F. Supp. at 899-903.
73 67 F. Supp. at 437.
74 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
INVALID PATENTS
that the asserted shield of patentability does not exist. '75 The
Court's recognition that antitrust policy must allow the government
to attack the validity of a patent, although only dictum and
limited to the situation where the patent is providing a shield for
otherwise unlawful licensing restrictions, provided a sound basis
for reevaluating the common law dogmas that had previously
prevented the government from attacking a patent's validity.76 Yet,
although recent cases demonstrate the government's willingness to
use the Sherman Act as a basis for attacking patent invalidity,
there is some indication that the government's power is unlikely to
be enlarged because of the hesitancy on the part of the lower courts
to permit challenges beyond the circumstances approved in the
Gypsum dictum.
In United States v. Union Camp Corp.,77 the Justice Department
brought a criminal action under the Sherman Act78 charging that
the defendant violated the antitrust laws by knowingly asserting
invalid patent claims. The challenge of the patent's validity was
linked to neither abusive exploitation techniques nor fraudulent
procurement; rather, the government urged that the antitrust policy
of protecting the public from the deleterious effects of invalid
patents was sufficient justification for reexamining the judgment
of the Patent Office. Although the defendant's plea of nolo con-
tendere precluded a thorough examination of these issues, the case
is significant because it reflects the government's belief that attacks
on invalid patents under the Sherman Act should not be barred by
the lack of standing arguments that marked its nonstatutory ef-
forts. 79
But the courts have not yet accepted the government's position
that the antitrust laws should be expanded to permit broader chal-
lenge of a patent's validity. In the recent case of United States v.
75 1hd. at-387-88.
76See text accompanying note 72 supra.
775 TRADE REG. REP. 5 45,067, at 52,664 (E.D. Va. 1968).
7 8 The Sherman Act provides that violators "shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the Court." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
79 1n a subsequent civil antitrust suit the government obtained consent decrees
restricting the defendant's use of the invalid patents. United States v. Union Camp
Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 72,689, at 86,452 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24,
1969); 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 72,843, at 87,105 (E.D. Va. July 1,
1969). For a detailed explanation of the developments in this case, see Note, Patents,
Fraud and the Antitrust Laws, 37 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 168, 176-83 (1968).
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Glaxo Group Ltd. & Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.,80 the gov-
ernment attacked under section 1 of the Sherman Act both restric-
tions in the defendant's licensing agreements and the validity of
the patent itself. The government alleged that the drug patent
held by the defendant, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., was in-
valid because it claimed a product which was previously known.
The district court, citing the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Gypsum, acknowledged that alleged antitrust violations permitted
the government to contest the patent's validity.8 ' However, the
defendant modified the factual similarity of Glaxo to Gypsum by
filing affidavits swearing that it would not raise its patent in de-
fense of the antitrust claim. The district court, concluding that
the raison d'etre of the antitrust attack on the patent's validity had
been destroyed, reinvoked the pre-Sherman Act rule that the govern-
ment could not collaterally attack a judgment of the Patent Office
and dismissed the complaint.82
The government's efforts to remove the "public menace" of an
"invalid patent masquerading as a valid one"' ' via the antitrust laws
are encouraging, but do not reflect the full potential for application
of the Sherman Act to the problem. Possession of a patent may
result in conferring upon the patent holder monopoly power in a
given market.84 Where the government has brought a monopoliza-
tion claim under the Sherman Act, the courts have permitted the de-
fense that market position was acquired as the result of a patent
grant. In such cases, the government has been required to support
its claim by a showing of additional conduct or abuse of the patent
grant.8s Under current antitrust principles, however, the govern-
ment should be able to attack directly the validity of the patent. In
80 5 'DTADi REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 72,828, at 87,031 (D.D.C. June 4,
1969).
81 Id. at 87,038.
a
2 The government argued unsuccessfully that the language in American Bell 1,
that a patent could be attacked by showing "fraud, mistake or error as to power"
(emphasis added), and changing public policy permitted establishing invalidity on
grounds other than fraud in the procurement. Id. at 87,039-41.
8 3 McClaren, supra note 58, at V.
84 Defining a relevant market which is monopolized is essential to finding a viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). The complexities involved
in the relevant market concept, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. For a
helpful explanation, see A. STICKLES, LEGAL CONTROL OF BUsINESS PRAcTIcE 166-77
(1965).
8 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co. (Carboloy), 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). "Although in a non-patent case exclusion, unlawful achievement, and abuse of
monopoly power may not need to be proved, elements of such conduct are necessary in
a patent case before section 2 may be invoked." Id. at 1015.
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the case of a fraudulently obtained patent, it is clear that monopoly
power is not obtained as the result of superior skill or foresight 6
and it is arguable that fraud in obtaining the patent grant consti-
tutes the requisite conduct which may give rise to monopolization.
Moreover, it can be argued that mere possession of even a non-
fraudulent invalid patent operates as an exclusionary practice87
which has the effect of creating a monopoly position. There is justi-
fication, therefore, for permitting the government to directly attack
the patent's validity to support a monopolization charge.
It is too early, however, to expect judicial attitudes to change
significantly enough to permit the government to successfully use
the full potential of the antitrust laws to attack invalid patents.
The courts are still struggling to determine the proper application
of the antitrust laws to all aspects of commerce, and the task is par-
ticularly difficult in the unique case of invalid patents because of the
existence of the common law dogma that the government has no
standing to challenge the judgment of the Patent Office. Despite
these present difficulties, the antitrust laws may soon evolve as the
government's best means to control unlawful statutory monop-
olies.18
4. FTC Attacks on Invalid Patents Under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.-- The general recognition that the
Sherman Act "did not inspire public confidence either in the ade-
quacy of the law or in the zeal of the Attorney General in prose-
cuting those who violated it" 9 resulted in the creation of the
8 0 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), a!f'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanikire-
viewed Judge Learned Hand's approach to monoplies violative of section 2 of the
Sherman Act:
[O]ne who has acquired an overwhelming share of the market "monopolizes"
whenever he does business . . . apparently even if there is no showing that
his business involves any 'exclusionary practice ... . MThe defendant may
[only] escape liability if it bears the burden of proving that it owes its mo-
nopoly solely to superior skill ... technological efficiency ... low margins of
profit.., or licenses ... used within, the-limits of law .... Id. at 342:
Fraudulent procurement of a patent is hardly the-"superior skill" contemplated by this
approach.
8 7 See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
88 An important advantage of the Sherman Act, as amended by the Clayton Act of
1914, ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Star. 730 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 28, 29 U.S.C.),
over other nonstatutory approaches is the availability of more effective relief. As com-
pared with the conventional remedies of patent cancellation or declarations of invalid-
ity, the Sherman Act allows the government to seek damages, injunctions, and criminal
penalties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4, 15(a) (1964). Moreover, an antitrust court's decree
might utilize such remedies as royalty-free compulsory licensing. See United States
v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844-45 (D.N.J. 1953).
89 Gushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, in REPORT
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 247
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 0 empowered to prevent the
use of "unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair . . . acts or
practices in commerce.''91 In the patent field, the FTC's broad
powers" have been widely utilized to attack such practices as tying
unpatented components to patented articles93 and price restrictions
maintained after the patent's expiration. 4 Even "bad faith" threats
of infringement have been prohibited. 5 But in only one case has
the FTC prosecuted a party for practices which rested on the integ-
rity of the patent itself.
In American Cyanamid Co.,9" the FTC charged that the de-
fendant "had prevented the patent examiner from making an ac-
curate appraisal of the patentability of tetracycline ... and [thatj
the intentional withholding of material information to obtain a
commercially valuable patent is an unfair method of competition
and an unfair act or practice. ' 9 T Although the FTC's efforts were
initially frustrated when the hearing examiner ruled for the de-
fendant on the theory that the misleading statements were not
material,98 the Commission reversed the examiner and held that the
defendant's fraudulent activities constituted unfair competition un-
der section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. After judicial
appeal and a subsequent rehearing by the Commission,"' the liti-
gation terminated with a decree compelling the defendant to grant
royalty licenses at a reasonable rate to all other interested parties.'
OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 205 (1937).
90 The FTC was created by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
9 1 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 4 5(a)( 6 ) (1964).
92 FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953), the Court
stated:
The "unfair methods of competition," which are condemned... are not con-
fined to those... condemned by the Sherman Act ... Congress advisedly
left the concept flexible ... to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act ... to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which when full
blown would violate those Acts ....
9 3 Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
9 4 Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949).
95 Cf. Flynn & Emrich Co. v. FTC, 52 F. 836 (4th Cir. 1931).
96 [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipu-
lations) 5 16,527, at 21,389 (FTC 1963).
971d. at 21,393.
98ld. at 21,405.
99 American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
100 3 TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 5 18,077, at
20,504 (FTC Sept. 29, 1967), af'd, Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
10 1 The FTC, in accordance with the court's original order, required the defendant
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Since the patent invalidity in Cyanamid concerned fraudulent
misrepresentations made before the Patent Office, query whether
the FTC can similarly prosecute the holders of nonfraudulent
invalid patents? The common law standing dogma that has plagued
utilization of the Sherman Act 02 may likewise impede FTC attack
of invalid patents. One commentator has noted that in the case of
a nonfraudulent invalid patent, FTC action may be precluded be-
cause "the Commission would be involved in collateral attack upon
the Patent Office determinations themselves.' 0 3  In addition, ques-
tions regarding the scope and extent of' the remedies available to
the FTC also remain unanswered. One dissenting commissioner
complained that the remedy of compulsory royalties would not
cure the unfair competitive advantages gained from the fraudu-
lently procured patent and suggested that the issuance of an injunc-
tion against the collection of royalties would be more appropriate. 4
But it is unclear whether such a remedy is within the -Commission's
power. The Federal Trade Commission Act provides that the FTC
may only issue cease and desist orders, °'5 and although Cyanamid
has given approval to compulsory royalty licensing, more meaning-
ful remedies such as dedication, compulsory free licensing, and
declarations of invalidity may not be available.106
In the case of fraudulently procured patents, however, -the Jus-
tice Department via suits for cancellation and prosecution under
the antitrust laws probably has the power to accomplish as much or
more in eliminating invalid patents as does the FTC. This has
led one author to suggest that "the Commission ought to refrain
from investigations into matters which can be more directly and
to license his patent at a royalty no higher than 2.5 percent of the licencee's net sales.
3 TRADE REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 5 18,077, at 20,522 (FTC
Sept 29, 1967).
10 2 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
103Note, supra note 51, at 1514. The author suggests that although the conflict
would be best resolved by congressional action, in the interim, the FTC should "confine
itself to cases in which it was bringing newly discovered factual matter to bear and
avoid those in which it would merely be second-guessing the Office on questions of
patent law." Id. at 1515.
'
0 4 See 3 TRADE- REG. REP. (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 5 18,077, at
20,522-24 (FTC Sept. 29, 1967).
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(b), 45(b) (1964).
106 See Rushefsky, FTC Section 5 Powers and the Pfizer-Cyanamid Imbroglio:
Where Do We Go From Here, or 'You Ain't Seen Nothing Yet,' 18 CATH. U.L. REV.
335 (1969). See generally FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1967); Freer,
Federal Trade Commission Procedure and Practice, 8 GEO. WASH. I. REv. 316 (1940).
But cf. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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efficiently handled by the Antitrust Division.' 0 7  Such reasoning,
however, ignores the inherent advantages of having two different
organizations work toward achieving the same objectives. More-
over, the failure of the Justice Department to effectively limit public
exploitation through the use of invalid patents emphasizes the need
for additional enforcement.
The 11 years that have passed since the FTC filed its complaint
in Cyanamid have demonstrated that the case has not served as a
catalyst for effective FTC regulation of unlawful statutory monop-
olies. In fact, Cyanamid stands as an isolated example of the
FTC's attempt to prosecute unfair competition claims based on
invalid patents. Although Cyanamid did not give the FTC a free
hand to attack invalid patents,'0 8 it by no means precluded further
efforts in this area and the FTC's complete lack of activity remains
a mystery.
The government's weapons to attack fraudulently procured pat-
ents are more than adequate. Under the doctrine of American Bell
I the Justice Department may sue directly to cancel the patent.
Under the Sherman Act it may seek relief against fraudulent pat-
ents which are monopolizing or restraining trade. And under the
Federal Trade Commission Act the FTC may attack such patents
which it finds constitute an unfair method of competition. But
when the invalidity is not connected with a fraud on the Patent
Office, the government's ability to deal with the invalid patent has
been severely limited. Although recent developments suggest that
the courts may soon remove these limitations, today's nonfraudu-
lent invalid patents are still beyond the reach of government pro-
scription.
B. Private Remedies Against Improperly Granted Monopolies
Traditionally, competitors have challenged the validity of a pat-
ent after its issuance by producing the patented device, awaiting an
action for infringement by the patent holder,, and defending on the
ground that the patent is invalid.0 9 The problem with this pro-
107 Note, FTC Held to Have Power to Render Inequitably Procured Patent Unen.
forceable, 38 N.Y.U.L REV. 1191, 1200 (1963).
10 8 See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
109 Although the defendant's success in infringement suits will usually remove any
unlawful competitive restraints, such a result is not always assured. A judgment of
invalidity in an infringement suit against one defendant will not preclude another suit
against a second infringer of the same patent. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons Co. v. Hunt,
188 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1951).
A second defense which is frequently asserted in an infringement suit is patent
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cedure, however, is that it is not always feasible. The cost of de-
fending an infringement suit may be prohibitive, and the possibility
of losing the suit may discourage even those most convinced of the
patent's invalidity.- 0 Moreover, where the competitor has taken a
license before realizing that the patent is invalid, he may be con-
tractually bound not to contest its validity."1 Also, there is no
guarantee that the patent holder will initiate a suit for infringe-
ment. He may simply rely upon the mere existence of his patent to
scare off the infringer's customers. Even where an infringement
action is brought or where the competitor wishes to directly attack
the patent's validity, questions of standing to sue and circumventing
other procedural hurdles face the litigant. Thus, even in the pri-
vate context, challenging the validity of a patent presents the litigant
with the problem of selecting the proper procedural vehicle with
which to launch the attack.
1. Attacking Fraudulently Procured Invalid Patents.- Al-
though the law is well settled that a private individual cannot
sue to cancel a patent issued as a result of fraud perpetrated against
the Patent Office,"' examination of the development of this rule
reveals a surprisingly inconsistent judicial foundation. Until 1836,
the patent acts actually provided for private suits to cancel fraudu-
lently procured patents." 3  In Mowry v. Whitney, n" the Supreme
misuse. This judicially created doctrine finds its origins in the equitable defense of
unclean hands, and renders patents unenforceable when the patent holder has utilized
his patents in making unlawful agreements not sanctioned by the patent monopoly.
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). Although the prob-
lems raised by patent misuse are similar to the problems surrounding invalid patents in
that there is a resultant unlawful restriction of another's ability to compete, they differ
from the problem examined in this Note in that the anticompetitive aspects of misuse
are not contingent on the patent's validity and any restriction on the patent's enforce-
ability ceases when the unlawful practices are eliminated.
11o See the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in Pickard v. United Aircraft Corp.,
128 F.2d 632, 638 (2d Cir. 1942):
For the expense of defending a patent suit is often staggering to the small
business man .... [The result is that many patents which are "spurious"
-i.e., would probably not stand up in court if contested--confer, in actual
fact, patent monopolies which are as effective ... as if they had been judidally
held valid. Id. at 641-42.
"'1But cf . Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully,
144 U.S. 224 (1892). In Lear, the Supreme Court permitted a licensee in a suit for non-
payment of royalties to show that his licensor's patent was invalid on the theory that if
the licensees were "muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would be monopolists without need or justification." 395 U.S. at 670.
"12 See, e.g., Mowry v. Whimey, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871); Americao Bell
11, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105 (6th
Cir. 1939).
13 The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat 109; the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,
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Court construed the omission of this private remedy from later pat-
ent acts to mean that Congress intended the elimination of private
cancellation suits based on fraud. On the same rationale, the Court
had decided earlier that such omissions also precluded an alleged
infringer from defending on the ground that the plaintiff's patent
was fraudulently obtained."" By 1945, however, the Supreme
Court had changed its position and finally established that the bet-
ter rule was to permit an infringer to assert the patentee's fraud on
the Patent Office as a defense to the infringement suit."1 The
maxim "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands"
had prevailed over the old statutory construction and collateral
estoppel arguments that had formerly led courts to reject the defense
of fraud. Yet despite the evolution of the defense of fraud in the
procurement, the courts have consistently (or one should say incon-
sistently) followed the Mowry doctrine and refused to permit an
affirmative cause of action to declare a patent void because it was
fraudulently obtained." '
Although a court has recently recognized private affirmative
attacks on fraudulently procured patents under the antitrust laws," 8
it seems unlikely that the judiciary will establish a per se private
procedure for voiding fraudulent patents. There is hope, however,
for legislative action which will restore private suits for cancella-
tion. 19
2. Attacking Nonfraudulent Invalid Patents.- The enactment
of the Declaratory Judgment Act120 provided a vehicle for private
attacks on nonfraudulently issued invalid patents.121  The Act "pro-
§ 10, 1 Stat. 318. The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Star. 117, and subsequent acts have
omitted any provisions to set aside patents procured by fraud.
114 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871).
115 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869).
1 6 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 342
U.S. 806 (1945).
117 See, e.g., I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 201 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
118 Holmes v. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp., 268 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
119 In the analogous area of trademarks, recent legislation has provided for private
suits to cancel fraudulently obtained trademarks. See Lanham Trademark Act § 14,
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964). See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE PATENT SYSTEM: "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, IN AGE
OF EXPLORING TECHNOLOGY" (1966) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
REPORT).
120 48 Stat. 955 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
.
2 1 E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1939).
Since it is now possible for a private individual to challenge a patent on the ground
that it has not met the necessary statutory requirements, the prohibitions against the
affirmative attack upon a patent on the basis of fraudulent procurement would seem
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vided an answer to the plight of the accused infringer [who pre-
viously] had little if any means by which he could secure judicial
refutation of the charges made against him."' 22  But the new
remedy was not without its problems, and the judicial resolution of
those problems quickly limited the Act's potential as a cure-all for
unlawful patents.
The early attacks on the constitutionality of the Declaratory
Judgment Act were defeated on the rationale that "in cases of
actual controversy . . . the judicial function may be appropriately
exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants
may not require... the payment of damages."'m This justiciabil-
ity requirement is now clearly established as a mandatory prereq-
uisite for litigating a declaratory judgment action; however, what
constitutes a case or controversy for the purpose of attacking. an
invalid patent is unclear. Some courts have found a controversy
sufficient to sustain a declaratory judgment on only an implied
threat of infringement based on the fact that the patent holder
had sued others manufacturing a product similar to the plaintiff's.1 4
Other courts have failed to find a controversy unless the defendant
actually charged the plaintiff with infringement.'2 Although there
is some suggestion that the courts favor a liberalization of the con-
troversy requirements 26 and that some day the mere existence of an
invalid patent might be sufficient to support an action for declara-
tory relief, 27 the immediate potential for such a development seems
unlikely. Thus, the declaratory judgment - an adequate remedy
for attacking invalid patents where there has been a threat of in-
fringement - is of little use when the patent holder takes no af-
firmative action, but relies on the mere existence of his patent to
limited only to situations where the fraud was not mateiial. If the fraud were material,
then the false or misleading information should alone render the patent invalid without
any additional showing of fraudulent practices. But the courts have not recognized
this distinction. In bringing an action for declaratory relief challenging a patent that
is invalid first because of anticipation by prior art and further because the patentee lied
to the Patent Office concerning this fact, prudence seemingly dictates that the plain-
tiff refrain from mentioning fraud. See generally E BORcHARD, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS 804 n.12 (2d ed. 1941).
'
2 2 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACtICE 5 57.20, at 3116-17 (2d ed. 1966).
=Aetn Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
124 Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943).
125 See, e.g., Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1941).
126See Note, Declaratory Judgments: Patent Litigation: Justiciable Controversy, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 506, 509 (1947).
12 7 See 6A J. MoORE, supra note 122, at 3120-21. But cf. E. BoRcHARD, supra
note 121, at 807.
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scare off potential competitors. The high cost of litigation, the
requirement that the plaintiff show some active steps to enter the
field,'28 and the fact that the remedy is discretionary with the
court 2 ' further limit the effectiveness of declaratory judgments.
3. Attacking Invalid Patents Under the Sherman Act.- Anti-
trust counterclaims in patent infringement suits today are common-
place. Most of the counterclaims attack the methods by which the
patent holder exploits his patent as an unlawful restraint of trade
not protected by the patent grant. Allegations charging the plain-
tiff with unlawful tying arrangements,130 price restrictions,' 3 ' and
pooling practices 32 are typical examples. The use of such tactics
under these circumstances offers two advantages to the defendant
infringer: The threat of treble damages133 may make many patent
holders think twice about suing the infringer, and, even if the de-
fendant's evidence is insufficient to establish the antitrust counter-
claim, it may be sufficient to show patent misuse which will prevent
the plaintiff from enforcing his patent.134
Antitrust counterclaims based solely on a patent's invalidity,
however, have evolved more slowly, and only recently have the
grounds of such counterclaims been used as the basis for affirma-
tive attacks. In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.," 5 the
Supreme Court allowed an antitrust counterclaim by a licensee in a
suit for royalties which challenged the validity of the licensor's pat-
ent. 3 " Although acknowledging the then extant doctrine that a
'
2 8 See 6A J. MooRE, supra note 122, at 3118, wherein it is stated: "If he may
merely have been considering the advisability of commencing production .. . he prob-
ably lacks standing to sue on the theory that his interest is not sufficiently immediate
or real to warrant judicial interference." But cf. Welch v. Grindle, 251 F.2d 671, 678
(9th Cir. 1957).
129The 1948 amendment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1964), changed the Act's mandate that the courts "shall" grant declaratory relief to
read that a court "may" grant such relief. See 6A J. MooRE, supra note 122, at 3025.
130 See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917).
131 See, e.g., Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372
(D.NJ. 1952).
13 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
133 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), permits any person injured
in his business or property by action violative of the antitrust laws to sue for treble
damages, costs, and attorney's fees.
'
34 See note 109 supra. Although the elements of patent misuse and antitrust
violations are the same, it appears that conviction under the antitrust laws is more dif-
ficult. See Nordhaus, Antitrust Laws and Public Policy in Relation to Patents, 3
DUQUESNE L. R-v. 1, 2 (1964).
.35317 U.S. 173 (1942).
136 See also Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394
(1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
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licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of his licensor's
patent,13 7 the Court held that the doctrine could not stand when
the plaintiff's licensing activities would violate the Sherman Act
but for the protection of a valid patent. Although the indirect
attack permitted in Sola indicated the potential for a private action
under the antitrust laws to control invalid patents, 23 years passed
before the Supreme Court, in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,3 8 recognized an antitrust
counterclaim directly attacking the patent's merits.
In Walker, the plaintiff sued for patent infringement and the
defendant counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the pat-
ent was invalid. Such a procedure was not unusual, and certainly
permissible under existing law.3" But, when the plaintiff moved
to dismiss his suit, the defendant amended his counterclaim and
charged that the plaintiff had violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by attempting to enforce a fraudulently procured patent. Al-
though the plaintiff argued that the Mowry doctrine prohibited a
private litigant from attacking fraudulently procured patents,140 the
Supreme Court distinguished the case from the common law can-
cellation suits and held that in the antitrust context the counter-
claim stated a cause of action.14 1
The holding in Walker fortified the private competitor's rem-
edies against invalid patents in two respects. First, it provided the
private litigant with a way to overcome the Mowry rule and to chal-
lenge, at least via a counterclaim, fraudulently invalid patents,
and second, it provided an opportunity for treble damages, 1' a far
more meaningful relief than cancellation or declaration of invalid-
ity. But the facts of Walker present an extreme situation. Query,
whether a private action for violation of the Sherman Act can be
maintained where the patent holder does not sue for infringement
and where the patent's invalidity is not the product of fraud?
In Holmes v. Struthers Scientific Corp.,143 the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania applied the Walker test and
refused to dismiss a complaint charging defendants with violations
of the Sherman Act based on their "conduct in acquiring and us-
13 7 See note 111 supra & accompanying text.
138382 U.S. 172 (1965).
139 See text accompanying notes 120-23 supra.
140 Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871).
141382 U.S. at 175-76.
142 See note 133 supra.
143 268 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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ing"'" certain allegedly invalid patents. The defendant had neither
brought nor threatened suit against the plaintiff for infringement of
the patent; however, the defendant had initiated suits against some
of the plaintiff's customers. The Holmes court found no reason
to limit Walker to its counterclaim context, but the facts do not
reveal whether the court also dispensed with the requirement that
the patent's invalidity be a product of fraud on the Patent Office.
It is not surprising, however, that litigants have urged that the
rationale that provoked the Walker decision should be equally ap-
plicable to invalid patents which are not procured by fraud.'45 In
a complaint recently filed in Maine Potato Growers, Inc. v. Union
Camp Corp., 146 plaintiffs brought an action for treble damages for
violation of the Sherman Act arising from defendant's attempt to
enforce patents which it knew were invalid. It is significant that
fraudulent procurement was not alleged, and that the alleged in-
validity was the result of material information, unknown to the
patentee when the patent was granted, but which nevertheless in-
validated the patent. Although the case has not yet been decided,
the fact that the patent was not fraudulently procured should not
defeat the plaintiff's claim. The evil that the Sherman Act pro-
scribes is monopolization through the use of invalid patents, and
the evil is not mitigated by the fact that the invalid patent was ob-
tained in good faith. Of course under present antitrust concepts,
to support a Sherman Act violation the courts may require, in addi-
tion to proof of invalidity, some showing of abuse or conduct, 147
but these requirements are distinct from the issue of whether an at-
tack on the patent's validity may proceed irrespective of whether it
was fraudulently procured.
The antitrust route, however, is not without its shortcomings.
Although the possibility of having to pay treble damages operates
as a strong deterrent,148 the difficulties inherent in establishing a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act diminish the possibility of actual recovery
144Id. at 124.
145 See Conley, Considerations in Patent Litigation Brought About by Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 9 S. TEx. L.J. 9, 13
(1967), which suggests that the Walker rationale applies as well to nonfraudulent
invalid patents.
146 Civil No. 3415 F (D. Me., filed April 8, 1968). For a summary of the com-
plaint, see BNA ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 354, at A-2 (April 23, 1968).
14 7 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
148 See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (1965),
modified, 395 U.S. 100 (1969), wherein treble damages were awarded in the amount
of $35 million.
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in such an action. In addition to showing fraudulent procurement
or perhaps particular knowledge or conduct on the part of the in-
valid patent holder, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's
invalid patent had an exclusionary effect on competition in a rele-
vant market4 9 and that as a result the plaintiff suffered actual
damages.150 Furthermore, the present requirement that the defend-
ant must actually attempt to enforce his patent precludes use of the
antitrust remedy against patent holders who are restraining com-
petition by scaring off customers of the competitor through the
mere possession of a patent grant. Finally, in the case of a com-
petitor threatened with a suit for infringement by the holder of an
invalid patent (whose invalidity is not due to fraud practiced on
the Patent Office), it is unlikely that an antitrust claim will succeed
unless it can be established that, ab initio, the defendant knew of
the patent's defective nature.'51
Despite the recent popularity of the private cause of action un-
der the Sherman Act, judicial precedent has yet to unleash the
Act's full potential as an effective weapon against invalid patents.
The private cause of action under the antitrust laws, established to
"increase the likelihood that a violation will be found out,"'1 52 still
falls short of its goal in the unique context of the unlawful monop-
olies of invalid patents.
4. Attacking Invalid Patents Under the Law of Unfair Compe-
tition.- The tort of unfair competition, once limited by the com-
mon law to "the practice of endeavoring to substitute one's own
goods ...for those of another, ' 153 has been expanded to include
149 Although the petitioner in Walker argued that attempting to enforce a fraudu-
lent patent should constitute a per se violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
Court refused to accept this view holding that the petitioner must also show "the ex-
clusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the
product involved." 382 U.S. at 177.
150 Proving this element may be difficult "IThe plaintiff must show the 'direct-
ness' of his loss for he can not recover if the injury is ... secondary, remote, incidental,
or indirect .... [Once the plaintiff has proved ... a clear and direct injury ... he
must prove the amount of damages." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 37-38 (1967).
See also Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for De-
struction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1566 (1957).
151 This requirement also pertains to fraudulent invalid patents when the patent
holder was not a party to the fraudulent procurement See Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Walker. "We hold today that a treble damage action for monopolization
... may be maintained .. .if the defendant was not the original patent applicant, [but]
he had been enforcing the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it
was obtained." 382 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
152p. AREEDA, supra note 150, at 36.
1
53 BLAcK's LAW DicriONARY 1699 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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many other unfair practices.' Federal courts in their exercise of
diversity jurisdiction prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,'55 devel-
oped a viable federal common law of unfair competition "in line
with maturing commercial views of the ethics of competition."'15
Since Erie, however, federal courts have been forced to abandon the
federal common law. If a private individual now wishes to bring
an action for unfair competition based on invalid patents, he must
find recognition of his cause of action either under the laws of the
state or in specific federal statutes.'57
State courts and legislatures have been slow to recognize con-
cepts of unfair competition other than the conventional tort of
"passing off." Although some states now acknowledge that other
unethical business activities - such as false product disparage-
ment' 58 and appropriation of trade values'5 9 - are within the realm
of unfair competition, there has not been complete recognition of
an action involving the anticompetitive effects of an invalid patent.
The development has instead proceeded on a piecemeal basis, 6 '
with the courts attempting to fit the particular unfair patent prac-
tices into established legal pigeonholes. In the early case of Emack
v. Kane,'" ' for example, the court enjoined a patent holder from
circulating trade notices claiming that the plaintiff's product in-
fringed his patent, from filing suits against plaintiff's customers
and then voluntarily dismissing them, and from other "bad faith"
154 See generally Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1940);
Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A Legal-Industrial Enigma,
60 HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1947).
155 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court held that there was no federal common law,
and "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Id. at 78.
156 Note, supra note 154, at 1316.
157 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964), the federal district courts have original jur-
isdiction "of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws." But
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964), "such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts
of the states in patent and copyright cases." (emphasis added). Since any suit for
unfair competition based on the alleged unfair practices of a holder of an invalid patent
may require the courts to determine the patent's validity, it seems likely that such a
matter would be in the exclusive province of the federal courts. But once the federal
courts determine that the patent is in fact invalid, they must look to the law of the
state or to an act of Congress to see if the defendant's activities in acquiring or using
the patent constitute unfair competition.
158 See, e.g., Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928).
159 See, e.g., Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921).
160 For an excellent discussion of unfair competition and patents, see Ladd, supra
note 7.
161 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
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practices on the ground that these acts constituted an unlawful
"trade" slander and libel. Additionally, courts have employed such
legal theories as malicious prosecution,"8 2 misleading advertising," 3
tortious interference with contract, 1 4 and defamation " 5 to control
patent activities unsanctioned by the patent grant.
Despite this absence of a dear-cut legal theory, the courts have
proscribed a number of unfair practices such as assertion of overly
broad patent claims " ' and threats of litigation against products
which clearly do not infringe the patent."" The element common
to these suits has been a showing of "bad faith," and it follows that
the assertion of patent rights by one who knows that the patent is
invalid meets this requirement. Conceptually, at least, recovery
should be available in a suit for unfair competition upon a showing
that the holder of the invalid patent both had knowledge of the
invalidity and had taken affirmative steps to enforce the patent.
Because of a failure to find a sound legal theory and a reluctance
to pass on a patent's merits, 0 8 most courts have required an unreal-
istically high showing of knowledge and conduct to support a claim
of unfair competition. 1 9 As a practical matter, therefore, the state
law remedy of unfair competition is effectively limited to pro-
scribing the most abusive practices, and provides little assistance
in challenging the more subtle attempts by invalid patent holders
to restrain competition. 7°
On the federal level, a litigant might find support for an action
for unfair competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.' The Act prohibits "unfair methods of competi-
tion, 1 72 and, as discussed earlier, the FTC has successfully prose-
102 Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913).
163 Panay Horizontal Show Jar Co. v. Aridor Co., 292 F. 858 (7th Cir. 1923).
164 Electropure Sales Corp. v. Anglim, 21 F. Supp. 451 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
165 Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. I1. 1888).
1G American Ball Co. v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 70 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1934).
167 International Indus. & Dev., Inc. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 145 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.
Ohio 1956), affd, 241 F.2d 246 (6th Cit. 1957).
108 But apparently consideration of the patent's merits is not mandatory to sustain
a claim for unfair competition. See Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ii. 1888).
169 See Shingle Prod. Patent, Inc. v. Gleason, 211 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1954).
170 As one commentator has observed:
This confusion as to a respectable legal theory often prompts courts to deal
with each case empirically .... Under these circumstances, not only is pre-
dictability at a minimum, but there is the danger that some judges ... will ab-
stain from action altogether. Ladd, supra note 7, at 374.
17138 Stat 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
172 Id.
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cuted the unfair use of fraudulently obtained patents under this
section. Although the Act speaks only of the FTC's power to
prosecute violations, nowhere under section 5 is a private suit ex-
pressly prohibited, and there is good reason to imply such a cause
of action.'7 Section 5 offers a flexible prohibition" 4 that is well
suited for controlling unlawful statutory monopolies, and, despite
the lack of judicial precedent, recognition of a private cause of
action could only "advance the general purposes of the Act.' '1 75
Legislative action through the passage of the antitrust laws and
the Declaratory Judgment Act has provided the private litigant with
the means to prevent patent holders from taking positive steps to
exploit their invalid patents. Also, further development of judi-
cial and legislative concepts of unfair competition may soon offer
another private remedy to "contain" invalid patents. But the pres-
ent private remedies are still subject to two limitations which have
effectively minimized their utility in eliminating unlawful statutory
monopolies: They leave untouched the invalid patent whose monop-
oly grant is not affirmatively asserted and they may be utilized only
through costly litigation.
III. PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE THE
REMOVAL OF INVALID PATENTS
The shortcomings of our present patent system which permit
the creation and maintenance of invalid patents have not gone un-
noticed. Commentators, scholars, and official commissions have
analyzed these problems and proposed many varied solutions.7 6
Since future legislation may incorporate some of these suggested
changes 17 and, thus, materially alter existing rights and remedies
173 See Note, Unfair Competition and a Private Right of Action, 9 UTAH L. REV.
961 (1965), in which the author supports a private right of action under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), by analogizing to the
implied private remedies developed under the Securities Acts. See also Bunn, The
National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REV. 987, 988 (1949), where the
author concludes that section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1964), providing for a private action for false marking of goods sold in interstate
commerce, would support a finding of an implied private cause of action under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
174 But see note 103 supra & accompanying text.
175 Note, supra note 173, at 977.
176 See notes 178, 182 infra.
177 Patent reform legislation pending before the 91st Congress can be found in
Senate Bills 1246 and 1569 [S. 1246, 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)), and House
Bill 12,280 [H.R. 12,280, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)). See text accompanying notes
185-93 infra.
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against invalid patents, the most significant proposals will be ex-
amined below.
A. Pre-issuance Proceedings to Permit the Public to Oppose a
Patent Application
Permitting public involvement during the patent application
period is one of the most radical modifications suggested to help
reduce the issuance of invalid patents.'78 Such a procedure was
recommended in a recent report of the President's Commission on
the Patent System 179 and has been substantially incorporated into
Senate Bill 1569, now pending before the 91st Congress.8 0 The
proposal would require the Commissioner of Patents to publish a
patent application at least 6 months before issuance. Parties who
feel they know of reasons why the patent should not be granted,
i.e., the applicant is not the inventor or the invention was in public
use, may make such information available to the Commissioner who
then may require reexamination or other ex parte proceedings' 8'
to determine the effect of the new information. Although such a
procedure would not guarantee that all patents granted were valid,
it would at least afford potential competitors an inexpensive chance
to prevent the creation of an unlawful statutory monopoly.
B. Post-issuance Proceedings to Permit the Public to Directly At-
tack the Patent's Validity
The recognition that public participation could significantly
aid in coping with the problems of invalid patents is also present
in many proposed post-issuance remedies. One early report sug-
gests than an individual should be able to challenge a patent in a
178 Other less forceful proposals aimed at the same objective include: (1) Adoption
of a "first to file system" which would consider the first patent applicant as the inventor
and thus eliminate complex interference proceedings believed to be the source of many
invalid patents; (2) placing the burden to show patentability on the patentee (i.e.,
in case of doubt, patentability would be resolved against the patentee); and (3) initiating
better examination techniques in the Patent Office. See Pnsmti',rr's COMM'N RE-
PORT, supra note 119, Recommendations I & X.
179 Id., Recommendation XI.
180 S. 1569, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 136, 151 (1969). An earlier proposal, S.
1246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and companion H.R. 12,280, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), do not provide for the pre-issuance opposition procedure. See, e.g., Banner,
The Recent Proposal to Change the United States Patent System, 29 OHIO ST. I.J.
873 (1968).
181 One author has criticized the use of an ex parte proceeding because he can
find no reason that "justifies depriving an opposer of his right to a hearing, if he de-
sires one." Kennedy, supra note 12, at 525.
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proceeding before the Patent Office anytime within 6 months after
its issuance. 182  Even the preliminary drafts of the present patent
laws contained provisions to permit the Patent Office to hold post-
issuance hearings and, if necessary, to cancel any improperly issued
patent.' 83 Although the provisions did not become law because
they were "considered too controversial,"184 the substance of the
provisions is again before Congress in Senate Bill 1246.185 Section
191 of the Bill permits "[a]ny person ...within one year after is-
suance of the patent [to] notify the Commissioner of publications
or patents which may have a bearing on the patentability of any
claim of the patent,"'186 and section 192 allows any person to notify
the Commissioner that the patent "was in public use,' '1 8 7 that
"the subject matter of a claim . . .is not patentable,' '1 88 or that "the
inventor named ...was not the original inventor."' 89  In the event
the information invalidates the patent, the Commissioner may can-
cel all asserted claims. 190 The Bill also provides that the identity
of persons submitting invalidating patents or publications shall be
kept secret. 9'
Another variation of the post-issuance proceeding to determine
a patent's validity has recently been proposed in the Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Research Institutes' "Dual Patent Program." ' 2
Under the Institute's proposal the issuance of a patent would be
open to challenge on any grounds for a period of 1 to 5 years."'
After this period had elapsed, the patent would become -uncon-
testable" unless one could show a prior invention or fraud or de-
1
82 See REPORT OF THE NAT'L PATENT PLANNING CoMM'N, THE AMERICAN
PATENT SYSTEM, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), published it 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
455 (1943).
183See PROPOSED REvISIoN & AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT LAWS (prelim.
draft with notes) H.R. REP. No. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 10,469 (1951).
184 See Harris, A Dual Patent Program: To Increase Patent Reliability and De-
crease Litigation Costs, 13 PAT., T.M., & COPYRIGHT J. OF RES. & EDuc. 1, 24 (Spring
1969).




1881d. § 192(a)( 2 ).
189 d. § 192(a)(3).
1901d. §§ 191(d), 194(a).
191 Id. § 191 (c).
192 For a discussion of this proposal, see Harris, supra note 184.
193 The plan would create two types of patents: A short 7-year patent for the
"short-lived," "uncomplicated" invention and a 17-year patent for inventions requiring
extensive development. Additionally, there would be a need to have two periods of
differing lengths in which to challenge the patent. See id. at 12-14.
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ception.19 4 Rather than have the patent's validity determined in
an ex parte proceeding before the Patent Office as suggested by
other reformers, the Institute proposes an inter partes hearing before
a special "validity court." In order to facilitate the attack on in-
valid patents, the proposal further provides for "a new type of
declaratory judgment [proceeding] that could be initiated without
the pre-condition of any existing case or controversy."'195 Apparently
this would enable any concerned party, regardless of his actual or
potential competitive position, to take affirmative action to elimi-
nate an unlawful statutory monopoly.
An inexpensive way for an aggrieved party to immediately chal-
lenge the propriety of an issued patent would constitute an effective
method to control the potential unlawful restraint of invalid patents.
Although these post-issuance reexamination provisions have been
criticized because they might "provide a means for extortion of
patent rights by unscrupulous competitors" and create "damaging
uncertainty as to the status of every patent,"'"" these inequities do
not seem to outweigh the evils inherent in an invalid patent that
may only be challenged through complicated and uncertain judi-
cial channels.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Many things have changed in the 200 years that the patent
system has attempted to "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts.""' Technology has increased in astronomical pro -
portions. The independent inventor, once the mainstay of the
patent system, has been replaced by huge corporate research and
194 Id. at 11.
195 Id. at 16.
196 Bean, Chapman, Fisher, Kramer, McCartney, Meyer & Pearne, Post Issue Pro-
ceedings - Worthwhile or Not? 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 245, 264 (1969). As an
alternative, the authors suggest an "open citation" system, wherein a party could cite
prior art to the Patent Office at any time and such citations would be added to the
patent as an aid to a potential defendant. The Patent Office would take no action
other than performing this clerical function. Id. at 258.
197 One additional modification of the patent laws that has been proposed is the
adoption of a doctrine of "in rem invalidity." Under this procedure when a patent or
claim is adjudicated invalid in one jurisdiction, the patentee would be estopped from
bringing suit in any other court and the Commissioner of Patents would be required to
cancel the affected claims. Although such a procedure would undoubtedly help con-
trol the abuses of invalid patents, it does not offer the affirmative remedy needed by a
litigant who is the initial victim of the unlawful monopoly. Both the PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 119, and the "Dual Patent Program," see Harris, supra
note 184, recommend the institution of this procedure.
OS U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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development facilities,'99 and the challenge of the early years to
assure that the system was "a stimulus to create and . . . an incentive
to reveal"2 ' has been replaced by today's challenge to find a means
of controlling patent abuse.201 The present law offers few practi-
cal means for an individual to affirmatively fight the "oppression ' 20 2
of an invalid patent: Unless the government will take up the battle,
the enormous expense makes relief through the few available chan-
nels prohibitive. Although in recent years courts and legislatures
have taken some steps to provide a more practical remedy to fight
the inequities of invalid patents, their efforts have not yet produced
the needed reform. Nevertheless, a successful solution is immedi-
ately required to protect not only the innocent competitor but also
the valid patent holder whose creative inspiration stems in no small
measure from the confidence that his inventive contribution is
worthy of a 17-year monopoly.
STUART A. LAVEN
199 One author has estimated that industrial research "performs 72 percent of the
inventing and discovering .... The contribution of unorganized inventors [is) small,
only 2.5 percent .... ." JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., INVENTIONS & THE PATENT
SYSTEM, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1964) [also referred to as GILFILLAN REPORT).
200 Note, supra note 42, at 326.
201 The following economic assessment has been made:
The plain fact is that our economic society ... bears little resemblance to the
economic society into which that system was born. It is doubtful whether
the Founding Fathers . . . ever visualized a situation in which the patent sys-
tem would be anything other than . . . a simple device for inducing inven-
tion .... It is in its relation to our highly industrialized and complex modern
economy ... that the patent system must be examined. Stedman, supra note
28, at 678.
2 02 See id. at 658, where the author observes that the practical problems an individ-
ual has in showing a patent's "spuriousness" is "comparable to that of an oppressed
people who can obtain no redress for their injuries."
